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Abstract
This paper explores private investments in public equity (PIPE) deals as a means
of alternative firm financing. Poorly performing companies often look towards PIPEs to
quickly raise capital when traditional means of financing are limited. This study provides
an analysis on both the discount and premia that PIPEs are issued at, as well as the
performance of firms after the deal announcement. Overall, this study finds that
successful PIPEs from the investor’s perspective are issued at a discount of close to 17%,
and unsuccessful PIPEs are issued at an average of a 15% premium. I find substantial
cumulative abnormal returns of 9% over a three-day period due to positive information
shocks. Overall, this thesis corroborates past research in the field.
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I. Introduction
On April 26, 2019, both the S&P 500 and NASDAQ composite indexes achieved
record highs, closing at 2,939.88 and 8,146.40, respectively (CNBC, 2019). Despite
modest news of an oncoming recession, 2019 marks yet another strong period of
performance. In fact, equity markets have experienced positive returns every year–except
2018–since the 2008 Great Financial Crisis.1 Debt capital markets have also performed
exceptionally well. Corporate bond issuances surpassed $1 trillion for the fifth year in a
row, and is projected to continue growing (Barclays, 2019). “It’s easier to raise money
[now] than any time… over the past 30 years,” said Carlyle Group founder David
Rubenstein in 2018.
There is plenty of evidence showing that stocks have performed well–but what
about the companies that haven’t? Not every firm will be successful. Plenty of high
quality companies end up strapped for cash due to poor investments, mismanagement,
and a host of other reasons. Firms in this situation are faced with a tough choice. If
management chooses not to cease operations, a likely pragmatic move is to raise more
capital. But how exactly should a firm go about this?
Debt financing may be difficult because firms, especially those with negative net
income, may not have the means to pay back the interest. Equity investments may also be
difficult. Firms can suffer from a lack of analyst coverage, poor trading volume, or
insufficient funds to cover the costs of a second public offering (Hogboom, 2004).
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The S&P 500 is used as a proxy for the equity markets. Returns retrieved from S&P Global

website.
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A. What is a PIPE?
This paper takes a deeper look into private investments in public equity, or PIPEs,
as an alternative method of raising capital. PIPEs are a special type of deal that involve
an investor–such as a corporation, asset manager, or high net-worth individual–
purchasing equity in a public company.2 PIPEs provide a quick means of capital for firms
in desperate need. For perspective, PricewaterHouseCoopers (2017) finds that a typical
initial public offering (IPO) can take as long as 12 months of work; a PIPE can take as
little as a few days. The catch is that PIPEs are issued with an assortment of deal
sweeteners and stipulations.
Most notably, PIPEs are often issued at a discount to the market value of equity.
Target firms typically need immediate capital to survive, so they have no choice but to
accept a lower valuation. Lim, Schwert, and Weisbach (2017) find that over 90% of firms
issuing PIPEs are worth under $1 billion in market capitalization and have a median book
asset value of only $51 million. Further, I find that the majority of firms that issue PIPEs
have negative net income and junk rated credit.
Additionally, PIPEs are typically issued with restricted shares, which are then
registered at a later date.3 The discount factors in the illiquidity that investors face due to
the lack of resale rights until the issuing firm registers the shares (Hogboom, 2004).

2
A public company is defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a firm that
trades its securities in a public marketplace, and reports specific financial and business information to the
public on a regular basis.
3
Restricted equity is defined by the SEC as a security that is acquired in a private sale that may
not be resold on an exchange, pursuant to Rule 144 of the Securities Act of 1933. When a firm issues
restricted equity, it promises to file for registration to give the investor the option to sell their stake.
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Stock warrants are also often added as a sweetener for the investor. A warrant is
similar to a stock option in that it allows an investor to purchase shares in a company in
the future at a specified price. Warrants have often been criticized for being predatory.
They generally contain extreme repricing rights and antidilutive conditions if the strike
price is not achieved (Hogboom, 2004). Hogboom also finds that warrants are often used
as retribution if the issuing firm does not register the equity on time. Lim, Schwert, and
Weisbach (2017) find that its inclusion dramatically increases the size of the discount.
Not all PIPEs come at a discount. In 2016, Google’s private equity arm Google
Capital (GC) purchased a $46.35 million stake in Care.com, an online provider of family
care and home services. GC paid a 24% premium to the market value of equity
(TechCrunch, 2016). TechCrunch notes that the firm suffered from typical ailments
discussed earlier: poor financial performance and poor float. This made a PIPE issuance
an attractive option. In the days after the deal announcement, TechCrunch notes that its
market capitalization nearly doubled.
This begs the question of how best to calculate the placement discount. A naïve
estimation of discount is simply a ratio of the PIPE equity value to the market equity
value. But markets exhibit semi-strong form efficiency, where stock prices reflect new
information (Fama, 1965). Therefore, a better measure of discount incorporates sufficient
time for the market to price in new information. Hertzel and Smith (1993) call this the
“with information” discount, and is measured as the relationship between the PIPE equity
value and the market value of equity ten days after the deal announcement. Therefore, a
PIPE is classified as placed at a discount if the “with information” market price exceeds
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the placement price. Likewise, a PIPE is classified as a premium if the placement price
exceeds the “with information” market price. This definition is structurally different than
the naïve interpretation. PIPE investors mandate a discount–in the naïve sense–almost
always. But the true performance of the deal is a function of the pricing in of new
information.
The amalgamation of deal sweeteners and the placement discount contribute to
substantial alpha for investors. Lim, Schwert, and Weisbach (2017) report that investors
earn an average of 4% abnormal return using a PIPE announcement play over a four day
window. Hertzel and Smith (1993) find similar abnormal returns of 4.4% over the same
period.
B. Hypotheses
This paper studies the sources PIPE discounts, as well as firm performance
around the deal announcement. Hertzel and Smith (1993) originally hypothesized in their
seminal paper that discounts are a function of asymmetric information about firm value.
The global economy has changed dramatically since the paper’s publication, so this study
serves to update their study with present-day information.
The main hypotheses are:
1. Hertzel and Smith Information Hypothesis: Firms where the capacity for
asymmetric information is high will continue to have steeper discounts.
a. More specifically, these will generally be smaller companies in
capital-intensive industries enduring financial distress.
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b. Firms where the PIPE is placed at a discount are fundamentally
different than firms where PIPEs are placed at a premium.
2. Positive shock hypothesis: Firms will exhibit positive abnormal returns in the
short term due to positive sentiment from the PIPE announcement. Longer
term abnormal return will likely be negative due to the introduction of new
information.
As an aside, the Care.com deal referenced earlier in this section forms the
motivation for this study. I participated in Claremont McKenna College’s Silicon Valley
Program during my junior year of college, where I interned with Care.com. This is where
I first learned of private placements as a method of financing. Since then, I have been
interested in sources of private placement discounts and premia, and used this study as an
opportunity to explore this interest.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, I provide a review of the
relevant literature on PIPEs and the implications of their use. In Section III, I describe my
data sources and methodologies. As I discuss the data, I also provide some insightful
market trends. In Section IV, I discuss my results. This section is broken into two parts.
The first is a discussion of PIPE discounts in relation to firm attributes, followed by a
multivariate regression analysis. The second part presents an event study around the deal
announcement period. Lastly, Section V concludes the paper by summarizing the
arguments, identifying limitations of the study, and offering future points of research.

5

II. Literature Review
There is meaningful research on PIPEs as an alternative method of capital raising,
but much of it is dated and may no longer accurately represent the current economic
situation. Among the most notable research is done by Hertzel and Smith (1993), which
explores reasons for both the equity discount and post-PIPE performance. Hertzel and
Smith hypothesize that discounts on private placements arise from asymmetric
information, in both the value of public information, and in anticipated changes in
managerial performance. The authors find that private placement discounts are associated
with the costs of uncovering the asymmetric information, and that deeper discounts are
linked with higher discovery costs. Deep discounts also are typical for smaller
placements, with the discount decreasing as the placement amount increases. In terms of
performance, the Hertzel and Smith find that there is significant positive market reaction
which drives up firm share price but is not sustainable in the long term.
A similar study was conducted to examine private placement discounts in China
(Lu, Si-fei, & Wei-xing, 2011). The authors find that Chinese PIPEs act in similar fashion
to American PIPEs. Investors still get the benefit of deep equity discounts, and positive
market reactions still occur on average. However, the study finds that equity discounts
may be even deeper for Chinese firms than American firms, and the {-3,0} day period
has higher returns on average. These findings are in line with Hertzel and Smith’s
findings.
A more recent study shows that firms seeking private placements will overstate
their earnings in the reporting quarter preceding the PIPE (Chen et al., 2008).

6

Specifically, current accruals will be overstated in an effort to portray increased revenue.
A sophisticated investor, therefore, will require a deeper discount on equity to account for
the inflated earnings. The authors estimate that the mean discount is 10%. Further, the
magnitude of overstatement is directly related to the long-term performance of the firm,
where more aggressive earnings inflation leads to worse long-term performance. In the
short term, however, market reactions to private placements are generally very positive,
with the discount-adjusted cumulative abnormal return averaging almost 16% in the {-3,
0} period.
Work has also been published on the types of investors that place engage in
PIPEs, including deal structure and post equity-issuance performance. Brophy, Ouimet &
Sialm (2004) finds that firms that receive private placements from hedge funds typically
perform worse that firms that find other types of investors. In terms of deal structure, the
study analyzes both traditional and structured PIPEs. Firms that issue structured PIPEs
perform worse than firms that issue traditional PIPEs. This happens because of the
generous repricing rights granted to investors in structured deals that activate when the
stock price falls. In contrast with the Chen et al. study, this paper does not find abnormal
returns for traditional PIPES from non-hedge fund investors.
In terms of the PIPE underwriting, Erhemjamts and Raman (2012) find that
investment bank reputation plays an important role in the equity discount. They find that
over 90% of firms use placement agents like banks, and moreover, that agent reputation
is correlated to more profitable and liquid investments. Since agents act as information
intermediaries, the presence of a more reputable bank on the deal may indicate large
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asymmetries. Interestingly, when firms partner with reputable agents, their equity is sold
at a lower discount relative to firms with less reputable agents. However, the authors find
that more frequent contact with agents is correlated to higher fees. Further, banks are able
to have a more sustained flow of material non-public information, meaning that a long
relationship indicates both information asymmetry and a good investment opportunity.
On a broader level, Chem, Dai, and Schatzberg (2008) conducted research on
financing options for firms, specifically between PIPEs and secondary equity offerings
(SEOs). Both methods of post-IPO financing are important for firms, but PIPEs may have
better properties for firms. These properties stem into three categories. First, firms may
not have enough access to capital to engage in an SEO, meaning that the PIPE market is
much larger and more accessible. Second, as Hertzel and Smith found, there is a high
degree of information asymmetry due to the undervaluation of firms requiring injections.
Therefore, firms will typically choose to have a private placement in hopes that the
relative discount on equity will be smaller than if raising capital through the public
markets. Lastly, issuance costs are lower for PIPEs than for SEOs, so any rational, costminimizing firm will choose a PIPE instead.
Lim, Schwert, and Weisbach (2017) conducted a comprehensive study on the deal
terms of PIPEs, specifically in the context of determining the cost of issuance. In addition
to studying the discount and returns of deals, the authors cover the implications of the
equity issuance themselves. First, they note that an overwhelming majority the
transactions sell unregistered shares. Thus, investors cannot sell their equity until the
shares are registered with the SEC, which often takes up to 100 days. In terms of deal
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structure, the authors note that almost half of PIPE issuances involve structured products
like stock warrants. Using the Black-Scholes model, they find that the inclusion of
warrants nearly doubles the average placement discount from 6.3% to 11.2%. Abnormal
returns for the PIPE investor increase significantly too.
Finally, Chakraborty and Gantchev (2012) propose an alternative role for private
placements: that PIPEs can increase shareholder coordination and help lower chances of
default. Because many features of PIPE investments require shareholder approval, such
as issuing more than 20% of outstanding shares at a discount, the authors of this paper
study congruency between shareholder votes in the context of raising capital. The study
finds that increased coordination of incumbent shareholders leads to a decreased private
placement discount. Additionally, the authors find that PIPEs increase the financial value
of the firm post-issuance in the long term. This seems to be a direct contradiction to
previous literature. However, the study finds that firms that engage in PIPEs have higher
probabilities of favorable debt renegotiations within a year of equity issuance.
III. Data & Methodology
A. Data Sources
The data used in this study comes from three sources. The first dataset is provided
by Pitchbook. The raw data is a panel comprised of all completed PIPE investments of
American firms from December 1998 – November 2018.4 The observations were
trimmed to only include those where the deal announcement date, deal size, and deal
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The full dataset is much larger, but due to the lack of efficiency in the private markets, many
observations were incomplete or incorrect. Each observation includes a description of the deal terms, which
I used to validate the data.
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share price are provided. I also stipulated that at least one investor is based in America.
This yielded a sample size of 149 observations. When further trimmed to exclude
observations where the percent acquired is not given, the sample size shrunk to 49
observations. Because of the small sample size, the analysis in this paper will be done
with the 149 observations that includes both known and unknown acquired percentages,
except where otherwise noted. A complete list of variables and definitions can be seen in
Table 1.
The second and third datasets are provided via Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS). The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) is used to gather a panel of
daily stock data. It includes stock price, shares outstanding, and benchmark daily returns,
and is used to extrapolate market capitalization and cumulative abnormal return. 5 CapIQ,
provided by S&P Global, is also used. It includes firm financial metrics and credit ratings
by date.
B. Methodology
Python is used to query, clean, and analyze the dataset. To query the stock-level
data, I use the firm list from Pitchbook to pull the associated ticker data from CRSP.
However, since PitchBook and CRSP do not use the same identification system, each
ticker is first matched to a PERMCO, a unique firm identifier provided by CRSP. Each
ticker is queried for data in the period {-30} and {-4, 10}, where negative numbers
represent days prior to day 0 and positive numbers represent days following day 0. Day 0
is defined as the announcement date of the PIPE, which is provided by PitchBook. Day
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The benchmark selected is the S&P500.
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{-30} is used to compute the firm market capitalization without any noise from the PIPE
announcement. Finally, the Python package Pandas Market Calendars is used to remove
weekends, holidays, and other non-trading days from the queried data.
To query the financial information from CapIQ, I first had to map each ticker to a
GVKEY, since S&P uses yet another identification scheme. Using a GVKEY and
announcement day pair, I collected information from the 10-Q that precedes the PIPE
announcement, so no information bias is factored into the ratios.
The two main dependent variables, the market discount and cumulative abnormal
return, are given by the equations:
𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕 =

(𝑷𝒊,𝒕+𝟏𝟎 −𝑷∗ 𝒊 )
𝑷𝒊,𝒕+𝟏𝟎

𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = ∑𝒕=𝑻
𝒕=𝟏 𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑬(𝑹𝒊,𝒕 )

(1)
(2)

The discount for deal i is measured by the change in stock price ten days after the
deal announcement day (𝑃𝑖,𝑡+10) and the share price that the investor paid (𝑃∗ 𝑖 ), divided
by the stock price 10 days after the deal announcement. This is the same formula used by
Hertzel and Smith. The metric reflects the magnitude of the private placement discount
for the investor with information. The parity of the sign on Discount represents if the
investor paid a discount (positive) or premium (negative) relative to the trading price.
This methodology of calculating discount is used as opposed to the ratio of the current
trading price and investor share price because it prices in the information shocks
embedded within the announcement period.
The discount is studied in two ways. First, I show the relationship between
discount and different firm attributes. The attributes studied comprise of financial,
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investment related, and firm related metrics. The second uses OLS multivariate
regression to explore different factor determinants and weights of the discount.
Yet, research shows that oftentimes firms actually pay a premium for shares. This
paper is novel in that it conducts regressions at the aggregate level, and then breaks it
down to the discount-only and premium-only level. This provides insight into overall
factors of private placement discounts, as well as specific factors that are unique to
discounts and premia individually.
To measure the returns for each deal, I use a cumulative abnormal return (CAR).
This is the sum of the abnormal returns from period {t, T}. The stock expected return
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ) is calculated using a Fama-French three-factor model, which takes into account
factors including size, book to market value, and market capitalization. I use this model
rather than a market model because more of the variation in returns is explained. I use a
cumulative measure for the event study because it allows for information to become
priced in at any date during the study period. The CAR is specified with the following
estimation parameters. The window used to estimate the expected return is 100 days, and
there is a 50-day gap between the estimation window and event study period.
C. Data Description and Summary Statistics
In-Sample Data.
Summary statistics for the sample can be seen in Table 2. The sample
corroborates that a typical firm that engages in a PIPE is midsized and poorly performing.
The average firm age is around 35 years old and employs over 2000 people. These seem
like healthy metrics, yet, the financial metrics tell another story. The mean market
12

capitalization is just under $200 million, but the median market capitalization is only
$20.69 million. Further, the standard deviation of firm size is enormous. Cash flow
margin is negative on average. And even though mean firm net income is $42 million, it
has a standard deviation of $848 million. These data corroborate the notion that
struggling companies are often a target demographic for private placements. It also
portrays the deal-by-deal nature of PIPEs.
Regarding the actual investment, the median deal profile is fairly small, at only
$25 million. Deal size varies drastically, with it ranging between $30,000 and $3.7
billion. Investors typically seek an 18% stake but can approach almost 50%. It is
important to note the limited amount of observations for this variable. This is attributable
to either Pitchbook not providing the metric for all of its observations, or by nature of the
private markets not disclosing all the deal terms.
Investments are often syndicated among multiple investors. The average number
of investors in-sample is 1.93 firms, with a maximum of eight. Interestingly, there is
evidence that the buy-side firms investing in PIPE issuances have different incentives
than firms that invest at earlier stages of a firm’s life. Out of the 1.93 investors, 1.71 of
the investors are new. Investors understand that the target is typically performing poorly
and that future returns are uncertain. Yet, they still require a discount to market value
even though it will degrade the firm’s valuation. So rather than having a traditional
growth thesis, buying parties have much more leeway on the target’s performance.
Evidence from Brophy, Ouimet & Sialm (2004) suggests that investors with high risk
tolerance–such as hedge funds–stipulate sweeteners like convertible debt and repricing
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rights in the case of poor performance that lead to higher returns for the fund but can be
detrimental to the firm. The study also highlights how hedge funds typically hedge their
investments, increasing the likelihood of returns regardless of the firm’s performance.
PIPE Market Trends.
Table 3 provides some insight into the marketplace for private placements.
Overall, there are 2546 deals captured by Pitchbook between 1998 and 2018. Because the
sample used in this study only includes observations with sufficient data, I inspect both
in-sample and out-of-sample PIPE trends as a sanity check. Both Figure 1 and Figure 3
exhibit the same trends and properties, which ensures that the sample is a fair
representation of the population. Figure 2 and Figure 4 are the percent changes of yearly
deals in and out of sample. Interestingly the process in Figure 4 is fairly stationary,
except structural breaks in 1994, 1999, and 2008, which coincide with the 1994 Great
Bond Massacre, 1999 Dot-Com bubble burst in, and 2008 Great Financial Crisis.
In terms of firm composition, Figure 5 shows that Healthcare firms are most
likely to raise money privately, in line with the paper’s hypothesis. This is likely due to
capital-intensive pharma companies requiring quick cash injections to recover costs
associated with expensive FDA trials or failures.
Lastly, Figure 6 looks at the number of days between the PIPE announcement and
the actual day it is executed. Interestingly, only 30% of firms execute the deal within a
week of announcement. Almost 50% of firms take more than a month from the
announcement date to execute the deal. Perhaps firms try to capitalize on positive
information effects twice: once from the announcement and again from the close.
14

IV. Results
Discounts and Premia

Figure 7 shows the distribution of Discount. It is approximately normal but is
moderately negatively skewed and has slightly thin tails. As a sanity check, is worth
nothing that the distribution is centered on a positive mean, which represents a discount.
However, it is still interesting to see a large number of investors paying a premium.
Table 4 helps explain this by presenting key descriptive statistics about Discount.
The ‘aggregate’ column describes the entire sample, and the proceeding columns describe
the subset of PIPEs where the deal is effectively a discount or premium, respectively.
In the aggregate, investors on average pay a 6.56% discount to the market value
of equity. But that number does not tell the whole story. The true discount that investors
receive is much closer to 20%. But the discount also varies drastically, with a standard
deviation of over 21%. This is attributable to the wide range of reasons that firms seek
private investment, as well as from a variety of firm-specific characteristics including
profitability and lifecycle stage.
In regard to the premium, I find that firms end up effectively paying about 1117% above market rate. There are two likely reasons that a firm would pay a premium.
Fund managers may pay a premium to outbid competition in pursuit of alpha. As the
number of PIPEs per year generally increases, investment firms may engage in bidding
wars with each other, which in turn drives up the investment price. The second theory is
that investors negatively reacted to the deal announcement and drove share price down.
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Discounts and Firm Attributes.
Table 5 takes a deeper look into the drivers of PIPE discounts. Discount and
premium magnitude do not exhibit much variation between industries. Private markets
are likely deep and liquid enough that firms can seek investment from any accredited
investor, regardless of industry experience. It is interesting to note that the absolute value
of an industry’s discount tends to be close to its premium. This implies that information
shocks are just as strong in both the positive and negative directions.
Regarding specific industries, IT firms tend to have the tightest range. This is
likely due to the oversaturation of private technology investors driving prices towards
their fair values. Additionally, the opportunity cost of raising money by other means may
be too costly. Many public technology companies have negative net income, which
makes paying off debt payments difficult. And equity financing may not be possible due
to low trading volume.
Next, using net income as a proxy for profitability, it is not a surprise that
unprofitable firms have a much steeper discount than profitable ones. Market investors
are expected to react positively to the capital injection. This supports the thesis that
positive information effects are stronger for less profitable firms.
Credit rating is used as one of the proxies for financial distress. Firms with poor
credit rating tend to receive both the highest premium and discount. The former is likely
due to positive information effects. The latter hints at the predatory nature of some PIPEs,
whereby some deals do not end up being good values for the firm. Overall, this more
importantly shows that firms with poor credit are more likely to be PIPE targets. There
16

are more firms in-sample with C rated credit than firms of all other credit scores
combined.
Percent acquired seems to be an important factor for discount magnitude.
Intuitively, it makes sense that larger fractions come at steeper discount. Investors require
compensation for larger ownership positions in the form of a market discount. Most
PIPEs occur between the 10-20% level. Investors are unlikely to spend time and
resources for smaller positions, and firms in financial distress will need to sacrifice a
meaningful amount of equity to raise an adequate amount of capital. Rule 144A states
that firms must receive shareholder approval before selling more than 20% of outstanding
float.
Along with percent acquired, deal size is an important determinant in discount.
There are large discounts for $5-20 million deals. Interestingly, premium increases as the
deal size increases. Larger deals likely signal deeper financial distress, which may scare
investors.
Book / market value of equity is used to describe a degree of over- or
undervaluation of a firm. Higher values are expected to signal undervaluation. The results
show a modest increase in discount as the ratio increases.
The discount seems to be agnostic to firm size as measured by market
capitalization. Even though the majority of firms are worth under $100 million, a firm of
any size can issue a PIPE. It is expected that investors would require a naïve discount
regardless of the firm size. It does not matter whether an investor places in a small bio-
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tech firm, or much larger cases, such as Berkshire Hathaway investing in Goldman
Sach’s bailout private placement in 2008.
Debt / equity is a good proxy for financial distress. The data shows the firms with
extreme debt / equity receive steeper discounts. For example, firms with negative debt to
equity have the steepest discount. This occurs when the book value of equity becomes
negative due to negative retained earnings. Similarly, firms with debt / equity ratios of 10
and above have steep discounts, likely as a reaction to the upcoming boost in equity.
The sample is fairly evenly split between PIPEs with a single investor and PIPEs
with multiple investors. In the aggregate, having multiple investors nearly doubles the
average discount. This is likely a result of the asymmetric power that investors yield.
Multivariate Regression Results.
Table 6 presents six models for measuring the discount. All models were
computed using linear regression with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
Model (1) tries to model discount by using mixed effects. It projects the discount
as a function of log of firm size, percent acquired, and an interaction term between the
two. Overall, 29.4% of the variation in the discount is explained. The constant and market
capitalization are both significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on constant is 0.331,
and the coefficient on log of market cap is -0.101. Therefore, as firms become larger, the
discount to share price becomes smaller. At the same time, as the percent acquired
increases, the discount increases linearly.
Model (2) builds off of (1) but adds a variable for log of deal size. Log of deal
size and log of market cap are both significant at the 1% level. The constant loses some
18

power, becoming significant at the 5% level, and percent acquired loses significance.
This model again shows that the discount transitions to a premium as the firm size grows.
But the discount is increase as deal size grows too. This model predicts that a 10%
increase in log of market cap would decrease the discount by 1.49 percentage points.
Model (3) introduces credit rating and book / market equity and takes out the
interaction variable. This model loses some predictive power compared to models (1) and
(2). Only 22.6% of the variation in discount is described by this model. The coefficients
on B+ and B rated credit are negative and not significant. However, the coefficient on a C
rated credit is negative and significant at the 1% level. This model projects that it is
beneficial to have poor credit rating. We have seen evidence of this before. As shown in
the previous section, firms with low credit scores tend to also have the largest positive
shareholder reaction.
Therefore, model (4) attempts to control for credit by adding a debt / equity term.
Cash flow margin is also added as an additional measure of financial distress. Credit
rating C is still significant, but now at the 5% level, along with cash flow margin. This
model, while only having an adjusted R^2 of 24.1%, starts to create an intuition for how
the discount is modeled. The coefficients on all non-junk rated credit are insignificant. So
even if a firm has good credit, it is not powerful enough to explain a premium or
discount. On the other hand, a credit rating of C brings the discount down to under 10%
from 29.2%. At the same time, the coefficient on cash flow margin is negative, meaning
more efficient companies bring the discount down further towards a premium. Finally,
log of market is significant at the 1% level, and has a negative coefficient. Therefore, a
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discount is likely to turn into a premium with large, efficient firms that are going through
financial troubles.
Model (5) is based on the regression in Hertzel and Smith’s paper. 41.6% of the
variation in discount is explained by this specification. Credit rating is removed and
replaced with other metrics of financial distress. The new measures are two binary
variables for profitability, “Generating Revenue; Not Profitable,” and “Profitable”. The
former equals 1 if net income is negative and EBITDA growth is negative, and the latter
equals 1 if a firm had year-over-year EBITDA growth accompanied with
contemporaneous positive net income. These variables are not mutually exclusive, and a
0 for both implies that a firm has no profit but increasing EBITDA growth. A binary
variable for single investor is added to measure effects on number of investing
participants. Percent acquired is also added back.
There are several notable features about this model. First, the constant is negative,
which implies that firms start at a premium, and certain characteristics drive the stock
price towards discount. The two new profitability variables are both significant at the 5%
level. Having no profit and decreasing EBITDA margin eliminates the premium entirely.
This intuitively makes sense, as investors typically invest in companies with future
potential growth, and this variable hints at the firm’s struggles. Having positive net
income and EBITDA growth also wipes out most of the premium, interestingly. This may
be due to investors’ willingness to pay closer to market price for these investments.
Again, results find that the sweet spot for PIPEs are the firms that are unprofitable but
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have high future potential growth. Lastly, log of deal size and percent acquired are both
significant at the 1% level.
Compared to the Hertzel-Smith model, both specifications have the same amount
of predictive power.6 Hertzel and Smith also include two additional variables that
measure the impact of change in ownership structure. They include a binary variable that
represents if the placement used restricted shares, which is significant at 1%, and a
variable for management buyer, which is not statistically significant. The sign, power,
and magnitude of the coefficients in the new specification are for the most part consistent
with the original model. The main difference is the number of observations. Because the
Herzel-Smith paper uses a more comprehensive dataset, they were able to achieve more
observations.
Lastly, model (6) combines elements of each regression. The model explains 72%
of the variation in discount, but only has 23 observations. The results from this regression
corroborate the findings from the previous specifications. “Generating Revenue; Not
Profitable” and “Profitable” are both significant at 1%. Credit rating B+ becomes
significant at 1% but is likely due to the small sample size. Credit rating C remains
significant at 1%. Log of deal size is negative, as expected, due to economies of
information. Neither percent acquired nor single investor are significant, indicating that
they are weak predictors of the discount.

6

The R^2 of the Hertzel-Smith model is 41.3%. This is a difference of 0.02 compared to the
specification in this paper.
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D. Performance
Lastly, Table 7 shows the abnormal return for several different investment
periods. Abnormal return is measured using both a CAR. Buy-Hold Abnormal Return
(BHAR) and the Patell Z of the CAR are included as a robustness check. As with a
normal Z test, the CAR Patell Z (hereon, Z) tests for a difference in distributional mean.
In this case, it is testing if the CAR is significantly different than the market return. This
test is unique in that it standardizes the event period using the standardized CAR, so each
period can be compared.
CAR is positive and highly significant in all of the event periods. For shorter
periods, including {-3, 10}, {-3, 0}, {0, 3}, and {0, 10}, it does not matter if a market
investor had prior information. Simply trading on the new information and holding until
day 10 generates exceptional abnormal returns of 9.93%. In fact, even if an investor has
prior information about the PIPE announcement and trades on it over the {-3, 0} period,
he or she would generate the least amount of abnormal return.
However, BHAR tends to have better properties in longer-run event studies (GurGershgoren, Hughson, Zender, 2008). Even though the CAR is positive and significant in
the {0, 150}, {0, 300}, and {0, 500} day periods, the mean BHAR decreases
exponentially as time increases. Further, the Z becomes relatively less significant.
Therefore, long-run buy-and-hold strategies do not perform well. This is likely due to
substantial new information about firms that gets incorporated into the returns. Perhaps
the PIPE is unsuccessful, or perhaps the firm mismanages the new capital and undergoes
Chapter 11.
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Overall, investors react exceedingly well when firms announce their intention to
raise capital. However, abnormal returns are poor in the long run because material new
information drastically affects the firms.
V. Conclusion
This study explores PIPEs as a method of financing for firms, specifically in
regard to the placement discount. Overall, the study agrees with previous literature. PIPE
investors still enjoy sizeable discounts and large abnormal returns.
The results agree with the Hertzel and Smith Information Hypothesis. Firms that
are more difficult to value tend to have deeper placement discounts. This difficulty of
valuation manifests in poor firm performance, such as poor credit rating, high book to
market ratios, and negative net income.
The key difference between firms that place equity at a discount versus a
premium lie in the future earning potential of the company. The firms themselves are not
exactly different, contrary to the hypothesis, but their growth prospects are. Deal size is
an important explanatory variable here. Larger deals likely convey a higher degree of
financial distress. Additionally, having too much debt relative to equity is a dangerous
factor that is likely hard to overcome in the future. On the other hand, firms placed at a
discount had positive EBITDA margins, as shown by the regression models, and other
signs of future profitability.
One important limitation in the study is the small amount of observations. The
data from Pitchbook is useful, but not as comprehensive as other sources. PrivateRaise,
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which is used in a number of other studies, seems to be the best source for future research
on PIPEs.
This study has opened various areas for future study. Earlier in this paper I
brought up the question of why firms wait to execute the PIPE after its announcement.
An event study would be an interesting topic to pursue to understand if firms benefit
twice from positive information effects.
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VII.

Tables and Figures

Table 1 - Variable Descriptions
Variable Class
Independent
Variables

Variable Name or
Category*
Discount

Percent acquired

(Stock price 10 days after PIPE announcement – PIPE
share price) / Stock price 10 days after PIPE
announcement.
Cumulative abnormal return on a stock using a FamaFrench three-factor model. The CAR period is
specified as {t0, t1}.
Percentage stake acquired.

PIPE share price

The share price that the investor purchased shares at.

Deal Class

A categorical variable describing the purpose that a
firm engaged in a PIPE. Reasons include: Corporate,
Hedge Fund, Venture Capital, Private Equity, and
Other.
Binary variable if the PIPE only had a single investor.

Cumulative Abnormal
Return
Dependent
Variables

Variable Description

Single Investor
Market Capitalization

Employees

Share price * number of shares outstanding 30 days
prior to PIPE announcement.
Total dollar amount in ‘000s that a firm raised with
the PIPE.
Total dollar amount in ‘000s that a firm has raised,
inclusive of the PIPE.
Number of employees contemporaneous to PIPE.

Number of Investors

Total number of PIPE investors.

Number of New
Investors
Profitability Measures*

Number of PIPE investors who have not previously
invested in the firm before.
Revenue, Gross Profit, Net Income, EBITDA, Total
Debt, EBITDA Margin, Market Capitalization. All
are from the quarter prior to the PIPE.
Calculated as 2019 – founding year

Deal Size
Raised to Date

Firm Age
Financial Distress
Measures*

Cash Flow Margin, Cash Flow / Total Debt, Cash
Ratio, Interest Coverage Ratio, Long Term Debt / BV
Equity, Quick Ratio, Return on Equity, D/E, Credit
Rating. All are from the quarter prior to the PIPE.
Book / Market Equity
Book value to market value of equity in quarter prior
to PIPE.
* Denotes a category header.
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Table 2 - Independent Variable Summary Statistics
Variables

Mean

Median

S.D.

Min

Max

Obs

Deal Size
Percent Acquired
Raised to Date
# Employees
# Investors

153.29
17.64
318.89
2353.85
1.93

25
15.2
131.01
223.50
1

420.78
10.30
638.34
6675.35
1.58

0.03
5.00
0.03
4.00
1.00

3700.00
49.80
3973.01
56000.00
8.00

149
46
148
126
149

# New Investors
Revenue
Gross Profit
Net Income
EBITDA

1.71
849.87
196.49
42.27
23.70

1
50.57
28.09
-13.36
-8.18

1.21
3260.00
403.46
848.35
253.56

1.00
0.00
-133.23
-1921.95
-1479.79

7.00
32363.00
2172.67
8600.00
1005.37

121
129
84
130
113

Total Debt
EBITDA Margin
Firm Age
Market Capitalization
Book / Market Equity
Cash Flow Margin

6090.46
-1355.41
34.67
196.12
0.71
-12.54

53.68
-15.54
23
20.69
0.401
-0.09

47656.92
4681.75
32.93
755.89
0.80
53.01

0.00
-33060.14
4.00
1.45
0.01
-374.61

483732.00
108.37
166.00
6457.22
5.21
1.43

103
99
144
105
83
76

Cash Flow / Total Debt
Cash Ratio
Interest Coverage Ratio
Quick Ratio
Return on Equity

-1.08
10.03
-259.66
10.58
-0.80

-0.06
1.05
-1.25
2.19
-0.43

2.63
54.33
875.11
54.32
1.76

-13.10
0.01
-4780.30
0.08
-13.86

0.86
450.94
220.54
451.47
0.72

85
69
47
69
84

Total Debt / Equity
Single Investor

3.04
0.98
5.59
-9.74
24.34
88
61.00
1
49.00
0.00
100.00
149
All financial metrics are in millions, except for ratios, percentages, and per-share items.
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Table 3 - PIPE Industry Trends

Figure 1 - PIPEs by Year: In-Sample

Figure 2 - Change in PIPEs by Year:
In-Sample

Figure 3 – PIPEs by Year: Out-ofSample

Figure 4 – Change in PIPEs by Year:
Out-of-Sample

Figure 5 – PIPEs by Sector

Figure 6 – Time Between Deal
Announcement Date and Execution

3%

B2B
6%

6%
14%

B2C
Energy

37%

14%

20%

Financial Services
Healthcare
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Figure 7 – Distribution of Discounts and Premia
This table presents a histogram of the independent variable Discount. Positive number represent
discounts and negative numbers represent premia. The data is winsorized to three standard deviations to
remove outliers.
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Table 4 - Summary Statistics of Discounts and Premia
This table looks at PIPE discounts from three lenses: in the aggregate, discount-only, and premium
only. Due to how Discount is calculated, all positive numbers represent discounts, and all negative numbers
represent premia.
Aggregate

Discount

Premium

Count
Mean

156

106

50

6.68%

17.08%

-15.35%

S.D.
Min

23.28%
-75.22%

17.94%
0.00%

17.23%
-75.22%

25%
50%
75%

-0.88%
7.09%

7.09%
10.18%

-18.37%
-10.56%

17.98%

24.14%

-1.73%

Max

99.77%

99.77%

-0.42%
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Table 5 - Discount Magnitude on Firm Characteristics
This table presents PIPE discounts and premia grouped by different firm characteristics. Each
grouping is performed on the available data, so the sum of the grouping’s aggregate count does not
necessarily equal the total number of observations.
Aggregate
Characteristic

Discount

Premium

Grouping
Business Products
and Services
Consumer Products
and Services
Energy
Financial Services
Healthcare

Mean

Count

Mean

Count

20.45%

9

20.45%

9

0.98%

12

21.48%

11.10%
7.79%
3.62%

13
25
34

0.13%

Credit Rating

IT
Materials and
Resources
Negative
Positive
A-

Percent

Firm Industry

Net Income

Acquired
Deal
Size

Book / Market

Market
Capitalization

Debt / Equity

Mean

Count

6

-19.52%

6

30.44%
17.56%
21.09%

9
18
18

-32.41%
-17.34%
-16.03%

4
7
16

6

7.85%

3

-7.60%

3

3.32%

3

17.02%

1

-3.53%

2

7.77%
3.34%
13.53%

74
28
5

23.77%
12.77%
13.53%

46
18
5

-18.51%
-13.63%

28
10

B+
B
BC
0-10

3.51%
22.89%

9
7

5.83%
22.89%

7
7

-4.62%

2

4.86%
2.76%
-8.82%

10
32
7

11.63%
19.37%
11.66%

7
18
2

-10.95%
-18.58%
-17.01%

3
14
5

10-20
200-5
5-10
10-15
15-20

11.29%
21.28%
5.67%
36.85%
11.24%
28.27%

20
6
10
8
9
11

24.59%
21.28%
15.94%
36.85%
21.02%
31.84%

14
6
6
8
6
10

-19.75%

6

-9.72%

4

-8.32%
-7.46%

3
1

20-100
1000-0.2
0.2-0.4
0.4-0.7

-0.59%
-2.32%
2.58%
3.02%
9.80%

31
33
21
18
11

14.16%
14.51%
19.32%
13.93%
21.42%

18
22
12
10
7

-14.42%
-25.17%
-19.74%
-10.61%
-10.53%

13
11
9
8
4

0.7-1
10-10
10-100
100-1000

3.76%
9.00%
19.19%
1.93%
-7.26%

9
21
38
41
19

10.99%
15.86%
31.44%
12.13%
13.25%

8
16
27
28
8

-54.08%
-12.97%
-10.87%
-20.04%
-22.18%

1
5
11
13
11

1000-

-0.47%

4

28.57%

1

-10.15%

3

-0
0-1

17.46%
4.85%

6
37

31.20%
19.84%

4
22

-10.01%
-17.13%

2
15

34

Investor Type

1-3
3-10

4.86%
4.39%

19
14

11.55%
16.47%

13
10

-9.64%
-25.81%

6
4

10Single Investor
Multiple Investors

11.08%
4.80%
9.06%

9
60
42

15.05%
22.76%
17.83%

7
37
27

-2.82%
-24.07%
-6.72%

2
23
15
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Table 6 - Regression Models
Credit rating is a binary variable that equals 1 if a firm’s credit rating equals the respective rating.
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Constant

0.331*
(0.169)

0.394**
(0.175)

0.332**
(0.133)

0.292**
(0.132)

-0.306
(0.188)

-0.115
(0.172)

Generating
Revenue; Not
Profitable

0.408**
(0.160)

0.533*
(0.079)

Profitable

0.295**
(0.128)

0.475*
(0.043)

Credit Rating B+

-0.096
(0.067)

-0.085
(0.065)

0.455*
(0.058)

Credit Rating B

-0.083
(0.066)

-0.073
(0.066)

-0.201
(0.117)

Credit Rating B-

0.037
(0.072)

0.039
(0.069)

0.094
(0.123)

Credit Rating C

-0.174*
(0.087)

-0.193**
(0.092)

-0.149*
(0.073)

Book / Market
Equity

0.018
(0.026)

0.034
(0.030)

Ln(Deal Size)

0.044*
(0.024)

-0.005
(0.024)

-0.009
(0.024)

-0.051**
(0.021)

-0.041*
(0.021)

Ln(Market Cap)

-0.101*
(0.037)

-0.149*
(0.051)

Percent Acquired

0.003
(0.005)

-0.001
(0.005)

Percent Acquired
* Ln(Market Cap)

0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

Single Investor

Obs
Pr(F-value)
Adj R-squared

-0.031
(0.033)

-0.039*
(0.019)

-0.049*
(0.007)

0.012*
(0.004)

0.009
(0.007)

0.030
(0.107)

-0.050
(0.093)

-0.005**
(0.003)

Cash Flow Margin

Debt / Equity

0.036
(0.033)

-0.002
(0.005)
33
33
58
56
27
0.004
0.005
0.005
0.008
0.012
0.294
0.314
0.226
0.241
0.416
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses

23
0.003
0.720

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7 – PIPE Performance
This table presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy-hold abnormal return (BHAR)
for different event periods. Day 0 represents the PIPE announcement date. All of the statistics are
normalized to the respective event period’s end date. The Patell Z is included as a robustness check for
CAR.
Information Status

Event Period

Mean CAR

Mean BHAR

Patell Z

With Prior Information

{-3, 30}

19.64%

19.78%

6.24

No Prior Information

{-3, 10}
{-3, 0}
{0, 3}
{0, 10}
{0, 60}

9.89%
4.76%
8.97%
9.93%
14.02%

10.72%
4.66%
9.80%
10.77%
10.03%

6.69
6.75
11.45
7.79
5.05

{0, 150}

20.07%

-6.27%

4.12

{0, 300}
{0, 500}

13.43%
22.55%

-227.35%
-481.65%

3.36
3.63
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